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SUMMARY
The purpose o£ this essay Is *e study tfie recent past performance of police. National Guard, and army forces In the control of the various and changing typos of civil disorders. Emphasis is placed on control and coordination of the several agencies involved. New concepts are sought, to reflect the newest avalldsle techniques .and equipment to minimize force while still obtaining maximum results from all elements employed. Riot control, civil disturbance operations, and confrontation management to cope with the changing character of disorders are discussed; from control of classic riots, through handling of violent demonstrations, to the management of campus confrontations. Av/areness of their civil rights by dissidents and criminal elements in our society, and the ever increasing protection afforded them by the courts have ccr.iblned to make operations against civil disorders much more difficult in recent years. The keeping or re-establishing of peace and order requires ever more sophisticated responses to insure not only efficiency, but also full le ö gality of the actions taken» Military operations based on these three principles require a high degree of control, ar-dlnatiop, and cooperation. In all cases,coordirvtion of at least two forces, local police and whatever military units are involved. Is required. Often, an additional number of civil authorities and law enforcement bodies must be controlled and coordinated to achieve a combined effort without wasteful duplications or, even more serious, diversity of purpose and neglect of citizens' rights.
To attain this necessary unity of effort has proved difficult. In some cases, the differing objectives of various civil authoritlfc* posed problems.
In other Instances, divergent training of police. National Guard, and regu- The Ohio National Guard had to be colled early, as Cleveland police did not have control of the situation from the start. Efforts at control were, in the beginning, left to police on the scene, but:
As Stokes (Cleveland Mayor Carl T, Stokes) was later to admit, Cleveland police were inadequately trained and supplied to cope with urban guerrilla warfare. According to Major General Sylvester DelCorso, Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, he had tried fo get the Stokes administration to discuss measures for handling racial disturbances but had been rebuffed. National Guard forces were used to augment police In the troubled area.
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The location of the university, typical for many others, split law enforcement at the police level into several snaii .segments: Campus police, the police departments of Champaign and of Urbana, Sheriff's officers. State troopers, and, finally, Illinois National Guard forces commanded by the EOH.
Considerable legal and jurlsdictional problems and difficulties arMe.
Until the arrival of Illinois National Guard units under command or BG.
Richard T" Dunn, the various police departments tried to cooperate by canmittee style decision ma'dng, but did not achieve unified actions« As a pro- Speojl probierrü uroie fron* the lack of cornpa.'-fbls radio frrcillrles. end some IntercspHon and even jamming of available channels by dissidents. Their leaders also had radio equipment to direct activities and disrupt law enforcement communications.
A recommendation favoring the use of scrambler devices and channels not subject to monitoring equipment in the hands of the dissidents was therefore included in the III.ARNG. EOH. After Action Report.
Ball Ammunition was no*-issued to troops during this operation, but was held in Battolior. ASP ready fo-issue. This fact was cnnsldered classified and was not released to news media at the scene.
The coordlrKition of Ulinois National Guard iroopi and the several police departments cs soon as implemented, quickly restored order and permitted recall of Guard units and resumption of normal operations by local law enforcement cgancies. 
